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Abstract
This paper analyses systemic risk in and the effect of capital regulation
on the European insurance sector. In particular, the evolution of an ex-
posure measure (SRISK) and a contribution measure (Delta CoVaR) are
analyzed from 1985 to 2016. With the help of multivariate regressions
the main drivers of systemic risk are identified. The paper finds an in-
creasing degree of interconnectedness between banks and insurance that
correlates with systemic risk exposure. Interconnectedness peaks during
periods of crisis but has a long-term influence also during normal times.
Moreover, the paper finds that the insurance sector was greatly affected
by spillovers from the process of capital regulation in banking. While Eu-
ropean insurance companies initially at the start of the Basel process of
capital regulation were well capitalized according to the SRISK measure,
they started to become capital deficient after the implementation of the
model-based approach in banking with increasing speed thereafter.
These findings are highly relevant for the ongoing global process of
capital regulation in the insurance sector and potential reforms of Sol-
vency II. Systemic risk is a leading threat to the stability of the global
financial system and keeping it under control is a main challenge for policy
makers and supervisors. This paper provides novel tools for supervisors to
monitor risk exposures in the insurance sector while taking into account
systemic feedback from the financial system and the banking sector in
particular. These tools also allow an evidence based policy evaluation of
regulatory measures such as Solvency II.
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1 Introduction
With the Great Financial Crisis the resiliency of the financial sector overall has
become a topic of major interest. Many discussions have focused on the systemic
contribution of banks, identifying and tightening the capital requirements for
the most systemic institutions. Only a few contributions, however, have looked
into the insurance sector, even despite the fact that in the great financial crisis of
2007-08 one of the first institutions in need of bailout has been the systemically
important insurance group AIG.1
Therefore, it has become a first-order priority to understand not only how
insurance companies contribute to systemic risk of the overall financial sec-
tor, but also when and why they have increased their systemic exposure and
their systemic contribution. The literature identifies the main drivers of risk in
the growth of non-traditional funding and non-traditional investment activities
(Cummins and Weiss, 2014, Weiss and Mu¨hlnickel, 2014)2. Moreover, insurance
companies and banks are becoming more and more interconnected (Cummins,
Wei and Xie, 2011, Chen, Cummins, Viswanatha, Weiss, 2013, Billio, Getman-
sky, Lo, Pelizzon, 2012) as the insurers business models are rapidly changing,
and their returns are comoving more with banks returns.
We start estimating the evolution of systemic risk for the European insurance
companies over the past three decades. In a sample of European insurance com-
panies, we measure systemic risk as the expected capital shortfall conditional on
the overall equity market being in severe distress (Brownlees and Engle, 2017)
and we observe that insurers are growing in systemic exposure since the begin-
ning of the 2000s, and the level of exposure is not decreasing, but reaching new
highs since then.
Moreover, when comparing the evolution of insurance companies SRISK with
the other subsectors, we observe that banks still are the major contributors on
average, though the new peak in insurers’ risk in 2016 should raise serious con-
cerns about the stability of the European financial sector as a whole. Therefore,
we study the drivers of such increase in systemic exposure in order to under-
stand better the nature of the structural change that we observe especially since
2002.
In earlier work, we have investigated the impact of Basel regulation on the fi-
nancial sector and on the European banks in particular (Gehrig, Iannino, 2017).
However, regulators, as well as researchers, have so far largely ignored the ef-
fect of changing business models that could transfer part of the systemic risk
exposure from the banking sector to other financial areas, in particular to the
insurance. Is the witnessed increase in systemic risk in the insurance sector due
to insurance companies effectively taking over banking related business such as
long-term lending and infrastructure investments? Is it an implication of regu-
1For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report states that “enormous sales of credit
default swaps were made without putting up initial collateral, setting aside capital reserves,
or hedging its exposure, a profound failure in corporate governance, particularly its risk-
management practices” (Phil Angelides, 2011).
2See Eling and Pankoke (2016) for a review of the literature.
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latory arbitrage? It is of great interest to understand this potentially divergent
effect of the Basel measures on individual bank risk (microprudential risk) vs.
aggregate systemic risk in other financial sectors (spillover of systemic risk).
There has been a long discussion on the need for insurance regulation (Har-
rington, 2009, Acharya and Richardson, 2014, Baranoff, 2012) since the Great
Crisis. In 2016, the IFM reported ”The contribution of life insurers to sys-
temic risk has increased in recent years [...] Supervisors and regulators should
take a more macroprudential approach to the sector [...] it includes the inter-
national adoption of capital and transparency standards for the sector.” The
process ended in the regulatory framework, known as Solvency II and applica-
ble since 1 January 2016, that binds insurance companies in a way very similar
in spirit to the Basel regulation binds banks.
Solvency II parallels the Basel regulation in at least two aspects: capital re-
quirements and internal models. With the objective of increasing risk awareness
and competitiveness, Solvency II states the requirements of holding ”enough”
capital to cover a larger range of risks than traditional insurance risks. The cap-
ital needs can be quantified by the insurance company with either standardized
formulas or using internal models under supervisory approval.
Having seen the unintended effects of banking regulations on the business
models and incentives of banks, the urgent question arises about similar unin-
tended errors in the insurance industry. Moreover, as we demonstrate, insurance
business models have already been deeply affected by banking regulation and
the induced substitution of banking activities by the insurance sector especially
in the area of long-term financing.
In terms of descriptive analysis, our main finding is the observation of a sig-
nificant increase in conditional capital shortfall in the insurance industry start-
ing in 2002. We also observe strong increases in interconnectedness, particularly
in the years 2007 and 2011. This applies to several measures of interconnected-
ness and appears relatively robust in this sense.
As to the drivers of the build-up in systemic risk in the insurance sector
and its interconnectedness, we identify essentially the same drivers as in the
banking sector. However, typically banks lead insurance, though we can assess
the contribution of different regulatory regimes on systemic risk exposure when
we distinguish different sub-periods. Importantly, we find that only starting
with 2016, lead-lag relations between banks and insurance tend to reverse, such
that systemic risk exposure in insurance starts leading systemic risk exposures
in banks. This evidence relies on a relatively short period of observations but
is statistically significant.
Our findings accord well with a recent Worldbank study by Malik and Xu
(2017). They find similar patterns of interconnectedness in a global sample of
systemically important banks and insurance companies as we find for a large
European sample of stock-listed banks and insurance companies including non-
systemically important ones. While these authors study various measures of
interconnectedness, they also find a close correlation of their indicators with the
systemic risk exposure measure SRISK on which our study is based.
A possible explanation which is consistent with the above evidence is capital
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arbitrage between banks and insurance sectors that have increased the riskiness
of banks business models. Koijen and Yogo (2016) find that circumventing
capital requirements is a major motive for life insurance companies to establish
captives in the US markets. This tendency started in early 2000 due to changes
in capital regulation of US insurance companies. While captives are not subject
to risk-based capital regulation, the risk is not transferred to investors outside
the financial group. Therefore this behaviour is leading to capital shortfall in
the overall group.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 pro-
vides a descriptive analysis of various systemic risk measures for the recent three
decades. Section 4 develops measures of interconnectedness and presents their
historical evolution. Section 5 introduces some methodology that is required
for the analytical analysis of the systemic risk drivers in section 6. Section 7
concludes with final remarks.
2 Data
In order to investigate the evolution of systemic risk in the different financial
sectors, we start with collecting data for European institutions from 1996 to
2016. Micro data on financial institutions are extracted from Compustat Global
and SNL. Table 2 reports the composition of our overall sample, and we can
identify institutions as (1) 195 commercial banks, (2) 215 diversified institutions,
(3) 77 insurance companies and (4) 115 real estates companies.3
For the inference section and computation of the interconnectedness mea-
sures, we exclude the real estate firms and focus our analysis on banks, diversified
institutions and insurance companies only. We also select the largest institu-
tions, belonging to the second and first quintiles of market capitalization in each
sub-sector.
In particular, the sample of insurers consists of 4 Insurance Brokers, 22 Life
& Health Insurance, 35 Multi-line Insurance, 10 Property & Casualty Insurance,
and 6 Reinsurance companies.
Table 2 presents the distribution of our insurance companies across 15 coun-
tries from the Euro-area, Switzerland and the United Kingdom4. We use quar-
terly fundamental (balance sheet) data as well as daily market prices and capi-
talization in order to estimate market measures of systemic risk.
Finally, we collect macro economic data from Datastream and the ECB
database.
3Due to a reclassification in the Compustat database in 2003, there is not a clear distinction
between the bank institutions in groups 1 and 2, therefore in the inference analysis we will
consider a single group for banks or diversified financial services.
4We include active as well as non-active institutions, for whom we have at least 10 years
of balance sheet data.
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Table 1: Subsectors in the European sample
Subsectors Frequency %
Banks (before 2003)/Diversified Banks (after 2003) 144 23.92
Regional Banks (from 2003) 35 5.81
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance (from 2003) 16 2.66
(1) Commercial banks 195 32.39
Diversified Financial Services (prior 2003), Other Diversified (after 2003) 31 5.15
Multi-Sector Holdings 19 3.16
Specialized Finance 16 2.66
Consumer Finance 8 1
Asset Management & Custody Banks 97 16.11
Investment Banking & Brokerage 32 5.32
Diversified Capital Markets 7 1.16
Others 5 0.83
(2) Diversified financial services 215 35.71
Insurance Brokers 4 0.66
Life & Health Insurance 22 3.65
Multi-line Insurance 35 5.81
Property & Casualty Insurance 10 1.66
Reinsurance 6 1
(3) Insurance companies 77 12.79
Diversified REITs 9 1
Industrial REITs 1 0.17
Office REITs 9 1.5
Retail REITs 3 0.5
Real Estate Management & Development 20 3.32
Real Estate Operating Companies 18 2.99
Real Estate Development 11 1.83
Real Estate Services 1 0.17
(4) Real Estates Companies 115 19.1
a This table reports the frequency of different institutional types in our sample. The categories are iden-
tified by Compustat Global, as (i) commercial banks or diversified institutions, (ii) diversified financials,
(iii) insurance companies, and (iv) real estates companies.
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Table 2: Sample by country
Country Frequency %
GBR 139 23.09
DEU 87 14.45
FRA 80 13.29
ITA 73 12.13
CHE 59 9.8
ESP 37 6.15
NLD 25 4.15
GRC 23 3.82
BEL 20 3.32
AUT 18 2.99
LUX 13 2.16
IRL 11 1.83
FIN 7 1.16
PRT 6 1
CYP 4 0.66
Total 602
a This table reports the frequency of
firms in each country in our sample.
3 Evolution of Systemic Risk Measures from 1985-
2015
How did systemic risk measures evolve for European financial institutions during
the past 3 decades?
We start our analysis by constructing various risk measures such as marginal
expected shortfall (MES), conditional capital shortfall or SRISK (Brownless and
Engle, 2017), and ∆CoV aR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) at the level of
the individual institutions. We present their evolution over thirty years as well
as their relation to measures of systematic risk.
3.1 SRISK
The first step is the estimation of the measures of systemic risk. Brownlees
and Engle (2017) define systemic risk exposure as the capital shortfall of an
institution when the whole financial sector is in distress. To be clear, systemic
risk is intended to measure systemic feedback and, typically, amplification of
individual risk.
In order to define the systemic risk measures assume a bivariate daily time
series model of the equity returns of institution i, dependent on a value-weighted
market index m that we proxy with the MSCI Europe index. Volatilities are
estimated with an asymmetric GJR GARCH process (Glosten, Jagananthan and
Runkle, 1993) and correlations with a DCC correlation model (Engle, 2002).
We evaluate measures of daily performance in the event of an extreme aggre-
gate shock, as the daily market index falls more than its 95% VaR. The expected
daily loss of the bank returns in this case is the Marginal Expected Shortfall
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(MES):
MESit(c) = Et−1(rit|rmt < c = q5%) (1)
The equity loss in a six-month horizon, the Long-Run Marginal Expected
Shortfall (LRMES), is approximated to 1− e(log(1−d)∗beta), where d is the 40%
six-month crisis threshold for the market index decline, and beta is the dynamic
market beta.5
Finally, we combine the market information above with the current equity
market value and the outstanding book value of debt. We determine the ex-
pected capital shortfall (SRISK) that an institution would experience in case of
distress as:
SRISKi,t = Et−1[Capital shortfalli|Crisis]
= Et−1[k(Debt+ Equity)− Equity|Crisis]
= Et−1[k(Debti,t) + (1− k)(1− LRMESi,t)Equityi,t|Crisis](2)
where: k is the prudential capital ratio, that we assume 8%.
The time evolution of our systemic risk measures seem to exhibit quite dif-
ferent patterns across sector and between banks and insurance companies in
particular.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average conditional capital shortfall
measure SRISK for different types of financial institutions from 1988-2016. As
it becomes immediately evident from this graph, positive capital shortfall has
not been an issue in the insurance industry until about 2002. It did increase
soon and already in the period from 2004-2008 the average systemic risk ex-
posure per institution was identical to that of banks. While the systemic risk
exposure per institution did not explode as much as for banks, it has been on
an upward trajectory since 2002. So according to the conditional capital short-
fall measure SRISK exposure to systemic risk has become a real concern with
increasing importance in the insurance sector since 2002. This date appears
closely related to the modifications of specific insurance regulations in 2002, like
directive 2002/83/EG for life insurance and 2002/13/EG for property insurance
preparing the road towards risk based supervision. Accordingly, it will be im-
portant to analyze the drivers of the systemic risk measures, which we will do
below in Section 6.
3.2 ∆CoV aR
Turning to another widely used systemic risk measure ∆CoV aR (Figure 2) a
different picture emerges.
∆CoV aR has been developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). While
SRISK focuses on the capital needs of an institutions in case of market dis-
tress CoVaR focuses more on the interconnection between institutions and the
5We also use a previous approximation as LRMES = 1 − e(−18∗MES), such as Acharya,
Engle and Richardson (2012). It represents the equity value loss over a six-month period
conditional on a market fall by more than 40% within the next six months.
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Figure 1: Evolution of systemic risk - SRISK. The Figure reports the evolution of the
average daily estimated SRISK for the four sub-sectors of the European financial system. The SRISK
is estimated by MLE using a GJR-DCC Garch model, as Equation 2. It represents the average daily
capital shortfall/surplus of each group, as banks (1), diversified financials (2), insurance companies
(3) and real estate companies (4).
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possible contagion to the whole sector. It only requires market data and it
corresponds to the extreme market loss conditional on extreme losses on the
returns of an institution i. The marginal contribution of firm i to the overall
systemic risk, ∆CoVaR, is the difference between the CoVaR in distress and the
CoVaR in a median state.
We estimate an aggregate extreme loss as its α%-Value-at-Risk, the maxi-
mum loss of the market return within the α%-confidence interval, conditionally
on some event C(rit) observed for institution i:
Pr(rmt ≤ CoV aRm|C(rit)t ) = α (3)
Using a quantile regression approach, we identify this distress event of firm i as
a loss equal to the (1− α)% VaR of firm i: rit = V aRit(α).
The systemic risk of the bank i is then defined as the difference between the
CoVaR of the financial system conditional on firm i being in distress and the
CoVaR of the financial system conditional on firm i being in its median state:
∆CoV aRit(α) = CoV aR
m|rit=(V aRit(α))
t − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)t ) (4)
Turning our attention now on the evolution of the contribution measure
∆CoV AR (Figure 2) a different picture emerges relative to the exposure mea-
sure SRISK. Again the trajectories differ across sectors but not dramatically so.
In fact there is much more commonality in the sense that they seem to peak
in the same periods. While there does not seem to be a general trend upwards
towards increased contribution to systemic risk a moderating long-term effect
induced by prudential regulation such as Basel I and II and Solvency I cannot
be observed either.
3.3 Systematic Risk
Finally, let us check the evolution of market risk as proxied by beta. We estimate
the market beta from a GJR-DCC Garch model between the firm stock returns
and the MSCI Europe index.
Figure 3 establishes that market beta had been quite volatile for insurance
as well as banking. We observe that till 2007-08, banks and insurers’ beta tend
to move quite similarly. However, there are also significant differences between
the insurance and the banking sector thereafter. The average beta of insurance
companies tends to trend down towards the end of the observation period, while
we see a volatile but uptrend upwards for banks.
3.4 Summary
By way of summarizing, we observe an increasing build-up of systemic risk in
the insurance sector. This can already be seen in the summary statistics of
Table 3, establishing that the insurance sector has already become comparably
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Figure 2: Evolution of systemic risk - Delta CoVaR. The Figure reports the evolution
of the daily estimated Delta CoVaR in Equation 4. We report banks (1), diversified financials (2),
insurance companies (3) and real estates (4).
systemically important as the banking sector according to a wide range of sys-
temic risk measures. While insurance with an exposure of 2.249 bill. EUR is
second in terms of conditional capital shortfall (SRISK) only to banks, in terms
of ∆CoV aR and MES the insurance sector even dominates the banking sector.
It is useful to distinguish between the two main systemic risk measures in
terms of the different aspects of systemic risk they are intended to measure.
SRISK is a conditional shortfall measure, and, hence, measures the exposure of
a financial institution with respect to market stress. As such it is an exposure
measure of systemic risk. CoVaR on the other hand is a measure of contagion,
since it provides a measure of how stress of an individual institution is transmit-
ted to other institutions. Accordingly, Delta CoVaR can be usefully interpreted
as a contribution measure to systemic risk.
Finally we should stress that in the implementation of Basel regulations as
well as Solvency II typically different holding periods are considered for which
exposures, or value-at-risk, are measured. This might seem to imply that we
should use different parameter choices for our systemic risk measures in the
banking and the insurance sector. Without denying the differential supervisory
treatment across industry sectors, we deliberately stay away from measuring
systemic risk differentially across industry sectors. In fact, we assume that the
underlying economics does not change by differential administrative procedures.
We can easily modify our risk measures according to whatever supervisory pro-
cedure is recommended. By treating banks and insurance equally we can unveil
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Figure 3: Cross-sector variation of systematic risk. The Figure presents the evolution
of the daily beta by different country, across time, from January 1987 to 2015. We report banks (1),
diversified financials (2), insurance companies (3) and real estates (4). It represents the sensitivity
of the bank equity returns to the MSCI Europe index returns. It is estimated by a GJR DCC Garch
model.
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potentially unintended economic spill-overs more easily, which might be masked
by differential supervisory treatment. Accordingly, for the sake of consistency
and comparability in calculating SRISK, we follow the parameter choices of
Brownless and Engle (2017) for the banking sector.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Financial Sector
Sector Market Value Total Assets SRISK ∆ CoVaR MES Beta M-t-B Zscore
Banks 6978.926 144901.1 6915.287 0.006845 0.016158 0.660389 4.131728 31.91816
Diversified 1151.392 18810.37 714.1439 0.005827 0.014671 0.527122 2.237037 3545.546
Insurance 5597.102 73985.83 2249.562 0.007391 0.016825 0.693799 3.633783 17.9186
Real Estates 470.9905 1146.032 -312.352 0.003577 0.010485 0.411477 1.973271 23.73448
Total 3208.856 57416.29 2412.573 0.006022 0.014817 0.570628 2.908429 1899.054
a This table reports the mean statistics of our main variables of interest, aggregated by sectors: commercial banks (1),
diversified financials (2), insurance companies (3) and real estates (4). We report Market capitalization, total assets,
SRISK, Delta CoVaR, Marginal Expected Shortfall, market beta, Market-to-Book, and Zscore of default.
4 Interconnectedness between Banks and Insur-
ance Companies
Given the dramatic increase in the capital shortfall measure in the insurance
sector, the question arises to what extent this could be related to the close
relations between insurance and banking firms. It might be that particularly the
shortfall measure reflects the close ties between the business models of insurance
companies and banks. In order to address this issue we develop a measure of
interconnectedness between the insurance and the banking sector.
Following Billio et al (2012), we measure connections as significant Granger
causalities in pairwise bank-insurance comparisons. For each pair of insurance
company and banks, we run a vector-autoregression (VAR) model on average
weekly returns of bank i and insurer j:
Rit = αi +
S∑
s
γisR
i
t−s +
S∑
s
βjsR
j
t−s + εt (5)
Rjt = aj +
S∑
s
λjsR
j
t−s +
S∑
s
bisR
i
t−s + ξt (6)
We determine the optimal number of lags according to the Aikaike infor-
mation criterion, and perform the VAR whenever there is at least one optimal
lag. Moreover, we can assign the direction of a connection, identifying either
the bank i or the insurance company j as the leader. We perform a Granger
causality test after each regression, and we classify the pair as a connection if
either j Granger-causes i if β is significant, or vice-versa i Granger-causes j if b
is significant.
While Billio et al. (2012) concentrate on return-spillovers at the mean re-
turns, we extend their methodology to include tail properties. Hence, we can
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better account for spill-overs in tail events such as crises phenomena. Therefore
we estimate lead-lag patterns in their Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES) be-
tween banks and insurance companies to identify connections that might only
arise in periods of critical market conditions. In order to do this we estimate
pairwise VARs on the MES of each bank/insurer pair and consider the number
of significant Granger causality connections as above.
For purposes of comparison we estimate the level of connectedness between
each pair of banks and insurers, as the number of significant relations that an
institution has with firms of the other group, both for the mean returns as well
as the marginal expected shortfalls.
Here we contribute an interesting and novel observation: The evolution of
our connectedness measure is consistent with a general rise in the level of inter-
connectedness in the financial system. As we see in Figure 4, insurance compa-
nies have tended to be more and more connected with banks since the end of
1990s according to both measures, based on mean return and based on MES.
This interconnectedness appears to have evolved symmetrically from insurance
companies to banks and vice versa. However, consistent with prior work this
increase does not appear particularly impressive. Only when spill-overs in the
tail are considered according to our MES-based measure, this relation becomes
much stronger. Moreover, it becomes apparent that the interconnectedness be-
came much stronger during crises-periods. So the interactions between insurers
and banks intensify particularly during periods of market stress. This observa-
tion is new and not available in pure mean spill-overs such as analyzed by Billio
et al. (2012) and others.
Moreover, we document cyclical patterns in virtually all of our interconnect-
edness measures. Interconnectedness was relatively low in 2005 and then again
in 2012.
A priori it is not clear, whether this increase in interconnections adds to
resiliency or to turmoil in unstable times. Do the interconnections help to better
diversify, and thus moderate risk, or will they contribute to amplify negative
shocks within the whole financial system? In our Section 6 we will address this
issue by measuring the impact of our interconnectedness measure on systemic
risk exposure. Before we do this multivariate analysis, the next section will
prepare methodological issues.
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5 Methodology
Before conducting the multivariate analysis, some methodological preparations
are required and presented in this section. In the first subsection we analyze
dynamical interaction between our systemic risk measure. We then introduce
a measure of market mis-valuation for individual companies that will turn out
useful as a driver of systemic risk. Finally we set up the multivariate regressions.
5.1 Comovements in the Systemic Risk Measures
We perform a VAR model on the aggregate system to measure lead-lag effects
in the previous main variables, market beta, Delta CoVaR and first difference
in SRISK. We run VAR models on sector averages of the banking system i and
the insurance system j, for lags s=0 to S, the optimal lag length according to
the Akaiki information criterion:
∆SRISKit = αi +
S∑
s
γis∆SRISK
i
t−s +
S∑
s
βjs∆SRISK
j
t−s + εt (7)
∆SRISKjt = aj +
S∑
s
λjs∆SRISK
j
t−s +
S∑
s
bis∆SRISK
i
t−s + ξt (8)
We perform a Granger causality test after each regression, and we classify the
pair as a connection if either j Granger-causes i if β is significant, or vice-versa
i Granger-causes j if b is significant.
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5.2 Market Mispricing
Market-based risk measures are often challenged by their dependence on market
prices. For example, regulators often refer to market-to-book anomalies as in-
dications of market irrationality or, at least, market distortions or mis-pricing.
In order to deal with this potential problem we also provide an attempt to
deal with potential mispricing. Therefore, we also estimate such misvaluation
decomposing the book-to-market into its mispricing component and its growth
opportunity component, based on the theoretical contribution of Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson and Viswanathan (2004).
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2004, 2005) break the market-
to-book ratio into three components: firm-specific deviations from valuation
relative to its contemporaneous peers (FSE), time-series sector deviation from
the long-run accounting multiples (TSSE), and long-run value-to-book, as proxy
for growth opportunities (LRVTB).
The log market-to-book ratio can then be decomposed as:
mit − bit = (mit − v(BVit, αjt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
firm-specific error
+ (9)
+ (v(BVit, αjt)− v(BVit, αj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
time series sector error
+ (v(BVit, αj − bbit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth option
We proceed estimating cross-sectional regressions of market value of bank/insurer
i on its book value, by sector j and week t, such as:
ln(MV )it = αjt + βjtln(BV )it + εit (10)
Therefore, we predict the value of the institution i, as:
v(BVit, αjt)) = α̂jt + β̂jtln(BV )it (11)
v(BVit, αj) = αj + βj ln(BV )it (12)
αj =
T∑
t=1
α̂jt (13)
and predict the misvaluation component as:
Misv = FSE + TSSE
= mit − v(BVit, αj) (14)
The evolution of mispricing across sectors can be seen in Figure 5. According
to this measure the occurrence of mispricings was quite different across finan-
cial sectors. There was significant underpricing in banking during the dot.com
bubbles while insurance was over-priced according to this measure. Both mea-
sures, however, seem to agree that mispricings have receded significantly both
in banking and in insurance after 2010.
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Figure 5: Evolution of Misvaluation component of Book-to-Market. The Figure
reports the evolution of the weekly estimated misvaluation in Equation 14. We report banks (1),
diversified financials (2), insurance companies (3) and real estates (4).
5.3 Multivariate Analysis
In the next step, we focus on bank-level data. We analyze the drivers of the
SRISK measures, particularly focusing on the spillovers between banks and
insurance companies, on a subsample of 173 banks and 29 insurers with available
data.
In earlier work (Gehrig, Iannino, 2017), we identified market beta, CISS
measure of market stress, Z-score measure of default, market return and long-
term interest rate, market capitalization and leverage as important explanatory
variables for the accumulation of capital shortfall in the European banking sys-
tem.
We use a dynamic specification where we first detrend SRISK from its first
lag, and then regress it using fixed effects panel regressions.6 For robustness,
we also show results using an IV estimator, where we instrument the first lag
of SRISK with its third lag. We control for the above set of variables Xkq−1,
measured one week back, and include the misvaluation component (Misv) and
the number of significant connections (NConnret or NConnMES) as described
6We also try a dynamic OLS fixed effects panel regressions, as the long time dimension of
our sample should mitigate the typical endogeneity issue.
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in the previous section:
SRISKeit = α+
∑
k
γkXkt−1 + ρ1Misvit + ρ2NConnit (15)
+ λ1IMMR+ λ2ID + λ3BII + λ4BIII + λ5SII
+ µi + εit
In order to control for major regulatory events in the banking and insur-
ance industries we introduce time dummies for the four important milestones of
the regulatory process: the first time dummy (1996 to 2002) marks the intro-
duction of internal modelling for market risk (IMMR); the second period from
January 2002 to June 2006 captures the effect of the introduction of the two
2002 Insurance Directives (ID); the third period from July 2006 until September
2008 catches the introduction of the Basel II agreement (BII); the fourth period
(September 2008 onwards) proxies for the process of reforming Basel II in an
attempt to reach agreement on Basel III; finally the last dummy controls for
the introduction of Solvency II in January 2016 in the insurance industry.
We measures spillovers between banks and insurers looking at the impact of
the number of significant connections between the two sectors, NConn. We use
both internconnectedness in the mean returns and in the MES separately.
In order to address the issue of mixed frequencies in our data we aggregate
the daily measures to their weekly medians. Moreover we include fixed effects
to address for other time-invariant firm characteristics.
We run separate regressions for banks and insurance companies. In the
sector ”banks”, we consider both commercial banks and diversified financials
as classified in the previous Compustat categorization. Insurance companies
consist of both Life and Non-life insurance types. The results are presented in
the next section.
6 Drivers of Systemic Risk
Let us now analyze the drivers of the exposure to systemic risk as measured by
SRISK: we will do this both for banking and for insurance. We perform similar
regressions on SRISK for both groups to scrutinize the role of interconnectedness
on the systemic relevance of banks compared to insurers.
When estimating the drivers of SRISK we employ three different measures
of interconnectedness, one measure based on mean returns (Table 4), second a
tail-centered measure based on the marginal expected shortfall (Table 5), and
third a measure based on lead-lag relations in SRISK (Table ??) Here we report
the results of the OLS panel regressions on the detrended SRISK.7
Starting with interconnectivity being measured on mean returns, in Table
4 we observe some commonalities but also differences across the banking and
7We have also performed IV estimations on a dynamic model with the third lag of SRISK
as an instrument, which generate similar results and, hence, are not reported here.
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Table 4: SRISK in Banking and Insurance: Interconnectedness in Mean Returns
(OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Detrended SRISK Banks Insurers
Beta -264.0*** -250.8*** -265.1*** -661.1*** -616.3*** -669.0***
(43.55) (40.86) (43.84) (120.6) (114.3) (120.9)
CISS 130.5*** 174.5*** 130.4*** 170.7 246.0** 168.1
(37.56) (44.01) (37.90) (127.9) (116.1) (123.9)
Zscore -2.747* -3.001* -2.760* -4.245 -7.950 -4.308
(1.490) (1.586) (1.499) (3.978) (4.863) (3.754)
Market Return 5,048*** 4,987*** 5,043*** 6,208* 6,000* 6,285*
(1,211) (1,199) (1,210) (3,099) (3,115) (3,087)
LT interest rates 1,104*** 590.2** 1,114*** 859.1 -914.4 1,012
(283.0) (297.9) (282.9) (1,547) (726.2) (1,668)
Misval -59.82*** -62.72*** -59.49*** -39.32 -59.59 -39.48
(22.16) (20.73) (22.06) (48.56) (44.53) (49.81)
Market Value 0.000431 0.00114 0.000335 -0.00323 -0.00145 -0.00350
(0.00126) (0.00122) (0.00126) (0.00217) (0.00236) (0.00214)
NConnRET 0.0105 -0.260** -0.152* -0.201 -7.382 1.063
(0.0295) (0.109) (0.0876) (0.722) (4.394) (3.932)
Period 2 (1996-2002) 42.17** 27.67* 57.68 45.27
(17.62) (14.06) (62.01) (64.49)
Period 3 (2002-2006) 96.96*** 84.58*** 340.5*** 387.4***
(31.21) (26.62) (105.8) (118.9)
Period 4 (2006-2008) 209.9*** 194.4*** 337.6*** 387.6***
(46.61) (46.13) (116.5) (119.7)
Period 5 (2008-2015) 106.6*** 101.0*** 183.6 237.2
(38.62) (33.78) (147.3) (159.3)
Period 6 (2016) 170.8*** 135.5*** 361.4* 274.3
(39.01) (32.85) (176.7) (194.5)
2.period\#NConnRet 0.194* 0.188* 3.660 0.711
(0.102) (0.100) (3.880) (5.560)
3.period\#NConnRet 0.283* 0.188 13.04*** -3.220
(0.150) (0.140) (4.711) (4.971)
4.period\#NConnRet 0.598*** 0.212* 9.647** -2.489
(0.150) (0.110) (4.570) (4.039)
5.period\#NConnRet 0.180 0.0960 2.677 -3.356
(0.140) (0.116) (4.330) (2.999)
6.period\#NConnRet 0.469*** 0.296** 10.04** 2.617
(0.127) (0.121) (4.776) (3.948)
Constant 126.8*** 228.1*** 139.1*** 643.1*** 898.3*** 629.9**
(41.72) (55.47) (43.46) (226.3) (214.7) (232.0)
Observations 103,166 103,166 103,166 15,552 15,552 15,552
R-squared 0.00777 0.00718 0.00777 0.0211 0.0192 0.0211
Number of firms 173 173 173 29 29 29
r2 b 0.00223 0.00560 0.00210 0.271 0.155 0.269
r2 o 0.00290 0.00270 0.00289 0.0125 0.0106 0.0125
r2 w 0.00789 0.00731 0.00794 0.0219 0.0200 0.0222
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F 4.293 4.825 3.818 15.07 10.45 19.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a This table reports the results from the panel regressions of SRISK with fixed effects for the institutions
belonging to the sector ’banks’ or ’diversified institutions’, and ’insurance’. Once detrended SRISK from
its first lag, we regress the detrended SRISK on market Beta, interconnectedness on the mean returns
(NConnRET), Zscore of default, Market Value and Market Misvaluation. We use 6 time dummies to
identify the major steps of the banking and insurance regulations, as the introduction of internal models
for market risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II (Period 3), the introduction of insurance 2002
regulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4), and the implementation of Solvency II
(Period 6). We use the dummies with and without interaction with the interconnectedness measure.
We also control for macro characteristics of the financial markets, using CISS measure of distress,
European equity market return, and long-term interest rates.
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Table 5: SRISK in Banking and Insurance Sectors: Interconnectedness in MES
(OLS)
Detrended SRISK (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Banks Insurers
Beta -263.8*** -253.8*** -264.4*** -672.0*** -661.1*** -701.6***
(43.61) (41.73) (43.84) (122.0) (121.9) (125.1)
CISS 114.7*** 131.8*** 111.1*** 87.89 235.9** 122.3
(35.99) (37.34) (35.45) (126.2) (109.5) (129.8)
Zscore -2.852* -3.127** -2.849* -4.480 -4.936 -4.523
(1.503) (1.516) (1.458) (3.746) (4.024) (3.142)
Market Return 5,105*** 5,087*** 5,107*** 6,414** 6,281* 6,331*
(1,219) (1,217) (1,222) (3,108) (3,112) (3,095)
LT interest rates 1,249*** 706.3** 1,251*** 1,140 -1,872** 2,997
(299.5) (289.3) (306.4) (1,583) (896.1) (1,769)
Misval -62.99*** -68.02*** -61.15*** -46.56 -65.91 -61.15
(22.37) (21.77) (22.20) (49.07) (53.16) (47.21)
Market Value 0.000423 0.000484 0.000112 -0.00403* -0.00311 -0.00421*
(0.00124) (0.00121) (0.00125) (0.00214) (0.00225) (0.00228)
NconnMES 0.0667*** -0.137** -0.0731 1.640*** -0.0667 1.821
(0.0159) (0.0641) (0.0537) (0.557) (2.337) (1.620)
Period 2 (1996-2002) 37.43** 16.42 33.29 -41.49
(16.99) (12.73) (61.77) (56.71)
Period 3 (2002-2006) 92.74*** 87.45*** 315.7*** 238.9**
(30.83) (24.43) (101.2) (108.2)
Period 4 (2006-2008) 199.5*** 120.9*** 301.5** 377.8**
(45.48) (33.98) (110.9) (142.5)
Period 5 (2008-2015) 106.8*** 87.10*** 181.1 456.5**
(38.83) (28.26) (142.1) (187.6)
Period 6 (2016) 170.6*** 147.8*** 346.5** 472.9**
(39.65) (33.33) (167.9) (216.9)
2.period\#NConnMES 0.131** 0.118** 0.501 2.307
(0.0547) (0.0550) (2.218) (2.403)
3.period\#NConnMES 0.164** 0.0778 4.376* 2.688
(0.0676) (0.0545) (2.358) (2.345)
4.period\#NConnMES 0.375*** 0.263*** 2.821 -0.255
(0.0848) (0.0611) (2.386) (1.917)
5.period\#NConnMES 0.187** 0.125* -0.0781 -3.482**
(0.0818) (0.0680) (2.626) (1.606)
6.period\#NConnMES 0.287*** 0.133* 2.437 0.173
(0.0767) (0.0683) (2.662) (1.879)
Constant 107.7*** 225.5*** 137.6*** 611.2*** 880.2*** 492.8**
(40.87) (53.87) (45.41) (218.8) (201.9) (216.3)
Observations 103,166 103,166 103,166 15,552 15,552 15,552
R-squared 0.00793 0.00796 0.00814 0.0217 0.0218 0.0228
Number of firms 173 173 173 29 29 29
r2 b 0.00316 0.00489 0.00281 0.270 0.262 0.267
r2 o 0.00308 0.00295 0.00311 0.0127 0.0134 0.0135
r2 w 0.00806 0.00809 0.00831 0.0225 0.0226 0.0239
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F 4.290 3.570 3.120 13.33 8.867 31.90
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a This table reports the results from the panel regressions of SRISK with fixed effects for the institutions
belonging to the sector ’banks’ or ’diversified institutions’, and ’insurance’. Once detrended SRISK
from its first lag, we regress the detrended SRISK on market Beta, interconnectedness on the Marginal
Expected Shortfall, Zscore of default, Market Value and Market Misvaluation. We use 6 time dummies
to identify the major steps of the banking and insurance regulations, as the introduction of internal
models for market risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II (Period 3), the introduction of insurance
2002 regulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4), and the implementation of Solvency II
(Period 6). We use the dummies with and without interaction with the interconnectedness measure. We
also control for macro characteristics of the financial markets, using CISS measure of distress, European
equity market return, and long-term interest rates.
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insurance industries. The systemic stress indicator CISS and market returns
are drivers of SRISK in both industries, while Beta is moderating across both
sectors. Differences do occur in the role of the long-term interest rate and
the misvaluation, which are both significant in the case of banks but not for
insurance. Interestingly, the long-term interest rate exerts a positive influence
on SRISK and, thus, reduces the resiliency of banks while it has no significant
effect on the insurance sector.
With regard to the policy regimes and the role of interconnectedness an
interesting picture emerges. While each policy regime seems to add to SRISK
in the banking sector, mainly period 2 (1996-2002), period 3 (2006-2008) and
period 6 (2016) seem to add to SRISK in the insurance sector. Focusing on
the period dummies, the regression results are consistent with the evolution we
observed in the average sectors. We see a steady and dramatic decrease in banks’
resiliency from late 1996s and all along the regulatory process of Basel. For the
insurance sector, we observe a sharp and significant increase in SRISK around
the implementation of the 2002 Insurance Directives and during the period of
adoption of the IRB approach of Basel II. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis,
we cannot see a significant build-up of conditional capital shortfall until 2016,
when again a significant increase can be observed. Actually, this increase is
much stronger with the other two measures of interconnectedness as can be
seen in Table 5 and Table ??. This increase of systemic risk exposure coincides
with the introduction of Solvency II. While we are still short on observation for
the implementation phase of Solvency II, this observation may appear worrisome
and suggests that supervisors should keep exposure risk under close scrutiny.
Moreover, regressions (2) and (5) suggest that this increase in SRISK is
largely related to increased interconnectedness between banks and insurance in
precisely those periods.
The most important parameters are representing the sensitivity of systemic
risk to the number of connections that an institution has with the other sector.
In Table 4 we observe that, on average, systemic risk is higher when a firm is
more interconnected with institutions from the other sector. This average effect
in present in both sectors.
However, if we consider the interaction terms between interconnectedness
and regulation periods, we see that systemic risk is higher for highly connected
banks after the implementation of internal models for market risk, in 1996.
Next we report the results of the regressions of SRISK on the interconnected-
ness implied by the marginal expected shortfalls. Table 5 shows similar results
as the previous Table 4 for banks. The level of interconnectedness with the
insurance sector does increase the systemic risk exposure of the financial sector.
We observe, however, that the impact of banks connections on the insurance sec-
tor is relatively weak. However the results are much stronger once we interact
the number of interconnections with the regulation periods.
Measuring interconnectedness via SRISK across sectors (Table ??) again a
similar picture emerges. Again the interaction terms between policy period and
number of interconnections are particularly strong in the case of banks and only
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weakly in the case of insurance companies.8
Overall we can conclude that it seems that interconnectedness with insurers
is weakening the banking system and the insurance sector. While we observe
significant intereactions between measures of interconnectedness and the various
milestone periods, those interactions are much weaker (i.e. less significant) in
the case of insurance.
Finally, we look at the aggregate system and perform a VAR analysis on the
major risk variables we have used before (Table 6).9 For all the three variables
under analysis, looking at first differences in SRISK, Delta CoVaR and market
beta, we observe that banks is leading the insurance sector in risk, particularly
market risk.
Table 6: VAR between banks’ and insurers’ risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DSRISK Beta Delta CoVaR
Banks Insurers Banks Insurers Banks Insurers
Banks, lag 1 0.110*** 0.00816** 1.084*** 0.227*** 1.099*** 0.101***
(0.0274) (0.00359) (0.0374) (0.0377) (0.0283) (0.0213)
Banks, lag 2 -0.0619** -0.000636 -0.250*** -0.153*** -0.201*** -0.0633**
(0.0274) (0.00360) (0.0513) (0.0516) (0.0411) (0.0310)
Banks, lag 3 0.0956* 0.0212 -0.00184 0.0167
(0.0516) (0.0519) (0.0414) (0.0313)
Banks, lag 4 -0.0956* -0.117** -0.00117 -0.0294
(0.0510) (0.0513) (0.0410) (0.0309)
Banks, lag 5 0.0719* 0.0113 0.0358 -0.0222
(0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0273) (0.0206)
Insurers, lag 1 -0.182 0.105*** -0.0172 0.804*** 0.223*** 0.807***
(0.208) (0.0273) (0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0372) (0.0281)
Insurers, lag 2 -0.428** -0.109*** -0.0391 -0.0297 -0.0465 -0.00125
(0.209) (0.0274) (0.0481) (0.0484) (0.0466) (0.0352)
Insurers, lag 3 0.0229 0.0494 -0.0224 0.0456
(0.0481) (0.0484) (0.0465) (0.0351)
Insurers, lag 4 0.0840* 0.115** -0.0437 0.0423
(0.0481) (0.0484) (0.0465) (0.0351)
Insurers, lag 5 -0.0203 0.0424 -0.0733** 0.0857***
(0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0282)
Constant 2.388 -0.550* 0.0450*** 0.0141** 0.000306*** 6.07e-05*
(2.250) (0.295) (0.00703) (0.00707) (4.63e-05) (3.50e-05)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,486 1,486 1,486 1,486
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a This table reports the results from VAR models on sector average SRISK (in its first difference), market
Beta, and Delta CoVaR between banks and insurance companies. We choose the optimal number of lag
for each regression using the AIC.
Indeed the Granger causality tests confirm this result (Table 7). We see
8The relatively weak significance most likely also relates to the fact that we have signifi-
cantly less observations in the insurance sector relative to the banking sector.
9We do not report the results on Zscore, as no relation is implied by the VAR models we
performed.
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that all variables, first difference in SRISK, Delta CoVaR and market beta, are
affected by the aggregate risk of the other sector, without a clear indication of
a leader-follower relationship. Only market beta show a strong leading impact
from banks to insurance companies. But generally causation is two-ways.
Table 7: Granger Causality Test between Banks’ and Insurers’ Risk
Equation Excluded chi2 df pvalue
DSRISK Banks DSRISK Insurers 5.384111 2 0.067742*
DSRISK Insurers DSRISK Banks 5.167401 2 0.075494*
Delta CoVaR Banks Delta CoVaR Insurers 53.60667 5 0.0000***
Delta CoVaR Insurers Delta CoVaR Banks 34.21802 5 0.0000***
Beta Banks Beta Insurers 12.32099 5 0.030645**
Beta Insurers Beta Banks 47.46632 5 0.0000***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a This table reports the results from the Granger causality test following the VAR models of
sector-average SRISK (in its first difference), market Beta and Delta CoVaR between banks
and insurance companies.
To spot changes over the six subperiods of our analysis, we perform the VARs
in the sub-periods and report the Granger causality tests for each in Table 8.
Once we look at the different periods separately, we see a strong lead-lag
patterns in term of contribution to systemic risk, Delta CoVaR (Figure 8). In
nearly all periods, a shock in the banking Delta CoVaR causes a positive impact
in the insurance CoVaR over several periods. Only in period 4 (2006-08) and in
the last period 2016, we observe an opposite pattern: a shock in delta CoVaR
in the insurance companies caused an increase in the systemic contribution of
the banking system.
We see that a positive shock in the insurance sector often produces a re-
duction in SRISK in the banking sector and viceversa, and this is happening
particularly in periods 2, 3 and 5 (Figure 6).
Finally, in terms of market Beta, we observe a clear pattern from banks to
insurance companies (Figure 7). With the exception of the market crisis in 2007,
and the last year after Solvency II, we see that a shock in the market beta in
the banking sectors is producing an increase in the market risk in the insurance
sector. It confirms the propagation of CoVaR shocks and the exception of the
2007-2008 years.
Overall the picture emerges that insurers are particularly affected by banking
sector shocks in normal periods. In periods of stress, however, causation works
both ways simultaneously. Only in 2016 a contribution from the insurance sector
to the banking sector begins to emerge. Despite the few observations the effect
already obtains statistical significance.
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Table 8: Granger causality test between banks’ and insurers’ risk, across subperiods
SRISK Beta Delta CoVaR
Leader chi2 df pvalue chi2 df pvalue chi2 df pvalue
Period 1 (1987-1995)
Insurance 2.6456 2 0.2664 0.9904 2 0.6094 6.9554 2 0.0309**
Banks 1.0369 2 0.5954 15.5918 2 0.0004*** 0.9645 2 0.6174
Period 2 (1996-2001)
Insurance 9.0763 2 0.0107** 3.8141 3 0.2823 2.5375 2 0.2812
Banks 3.1947 2 0.2024 7.9832 3 0.0464** 29.8893 2 0.0000***
Period 3 (2002-2006)
Insurance 6.0482 1 0.0139** 6.7370 2 0.0344** 3.0522 2 0.2174
Banks 4.1191 1 0.0424** 19.9511 2 0.0000*** 16.8171 2 0.0002***
Period 4 (2006-2008)
Insurance 3.8181 2 0.1482 11.3488 3 0.0100*** 24.6843 2 0.0000***
Banks 1.2159 2 0.5445 4.5872 3 0.2046 22.0649 2 0.0000***
Period 5 (2008-2015)
Insurance 16.5559 6 0.0111** 7.5890 4 0.1078 7.8638 5 0.1639
Banks 11.5688 6 0.0723* 20.1252 4 0.0005*** 38.2138 5 0.0000***
Period 6 (2016)
Insurance 1.7019 2 0.4270 0.2327 2 0.8902 50.3228 2 0.0000***
Banks 0.2982 2 0.8615 13.2681 2 0.0013 0.1563 2 0.9248
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a the results from VAR models, for each sub-period separately, on sector average SRISK (in its first differ-
ence), market Beta, and Delta CoVaR between banks and insurance companies. We distinguish 6 periods
of interest: as the introduction of internal models for market risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II
(Period 3), the introduction of insurance 2002 regulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4),
and the implementation of Solvency II (Period 6). We choose the optimal number of lag for each regression
using the AIC.
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Figure 6: Cumulative Impulse-Response Functions of SRISK (first-difference)
over the 6 Sub-periods.We distinguish: before Basel I (Period 1), the introduction of internal
models for market risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II (Period 3), the introduction of
insurance 2002 regulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4), and the implementation
of Solvency II (Period 6).
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Figure 7: Cumulative impulse-response function of Beta over the 6 sub-
periods.We distinguish: before Basel I (Period 1), the introduction of internal models for market
risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II (Period 3), the introduction of insurance 2002 reg-
ulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4), and the implementation of Solvency II
(Period 6).
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Figure 8: Cumulative impulse-response function of Delta CoVaR over the 6
sub-periods.We distinguish: before Basel I (Period 1), the introduction of internal models for
market risks (Period 2), the introduction of Basel II (Period 3), the introduction of insurance 2002
regulation (Period 3), the guidelines for Basel III (Period 4), and the implementation of Solvency
II (Period 6).
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7 Conclusions
This paper derives from an empirical investigation of the resiliency of the Eu-
ropean financial system. It analyses the evolution of systemic risk measures
for its various subsectors, banks and insurance companies in particular. This
study allows us to trace the effects of the regulatory process in each subsector
on the systemic risk exposure within that sector and its spillovers into other
sectors. The insurance sector is particularly interesting, since its regulation was
introduced with some time lag after corresponding regulation in the banking
industry. In particular the regulation of capital followed earlier rules in the
banking sector.
In this study we document a significant build-up of systemic risk in the
European insurance sector that goes hand in hand with the implementation of
the 2002 EU-Directives for life and property insurances, creating a new source
of systemic risk: capital shortfall in the insurance sector.
Important drivers across sectors constitute their interconnections. It seems
that the number of interconnections contributed to the build-up of systemic risk
particularly after 1996 in the banking sector and after 2002 in the insurance
sector.
Moreover, we identify important spill-overs from the banking industry to the
insurance sector. Hitherto mainly systemic shocks to the banking sector were
transmitted to the insurance sector but since 2016 we also see evidence in the
other direction, i.e. from insurance to banking.
In light of our results and the experiences after the implementation of Basel
II the introduction of Solvency II in January 2016 raises concerns about the
capitalization of the insurance sector. There is a real danger that the lessons of
the lack of capital of European banks during the Great Financial Crisis might be
repeated in the insurance sector after negative economic shocks. Accordingly,
European supervisors should be particularly concerned with the capitalization
of large European insurance companies. Based on a completely different global
sample of banks and insurance companies Malik and Xu (2017) reach a very
similar conclusion about heightened need of supervision of globally active insur-
ance companies, especially concerning their relations to banks.
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